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ROBERTSON AND NICHOLAS
IAN ROBERTSON.

)
:
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action based on an Order to Show Cause, issued
at the behest of the Appellants, directed to the Respondent,
why the Respondent should not be adjudged to have abandoned and
deserted her minor children, Wendy Jo Robertson and Nicholas Ian
Robertson, why the Respondent's rights as the natural mother
should not be extinguished, and why the Petition for Adoption
of Appellants should not be granted.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court below, Honorable GEORGE E. BALLIF, Judge, sitting
without a jury, found that the Respondent had not deserted her
children and ordered the Appellants' Petition for Adoption
dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judgment of the trial
court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent essentially agrees with the Statement of Facts
set forth by Appellants, except such statement fails to disclose
that Respondent offered to controvert and dispute the testimony
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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proffered by Appellants with respect to matters preceding the
divorce decree, should the Court have admitted the same
(Tr. 51, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71); that Respondent was informed
about the children from time to time and such information
indicated that the children were being adequately cared for by
the Appellants (Tr. 19, 38, 44); and that the Respondent did
not contact the children between the time of the divorce decree
in

April 1971 and July 1975, when efforts to contact them were

made by the Respondent, because of a serious accident and injuries to her in March of 1971, which rendered her physically,
emotionally and financially unable to assume any meaningful
relationship with such children any sooner (Tr. 23, 36, 37, 44).
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL CLEARLY PREPONDERATES
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD
NOT DESERTED HER MINOR CHILDREN.
While in an equity action such as this, the Court on appeal
is authorized to review the evidence and the Findings of the
court below, those Findings will not be set aside,
"Unless it manifestly appears that the trial court
has misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence."
(STANLEY vs. STANLEY, 97 Utah 520; 94 P. 2d 465)
In the matter now before the Court the ultimate question
is whether or not the Respondent deserted her children within
the meaning of the law so as to obviate the necessity of her
consent to the adoption of such children by another (R. 72, 73)
(Section 78-30-5 UCA 1953 as amended).

This Court on previous

occasions has held that "deserted" means:
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"An intentional abandonment, rather than a separation
due to misfortune or misconduct".
M

An intent to sever all correlative rights and duties
of the parent-child relationship".
(IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF JAMESON, 20 Utah 2d 53, 432 P.
2d 881; WORTHEN vs. WALTON, 123 Utah 380, 259 P. 2d 881). This
Court has further held, as set forth in the last above mentioned
cases, that proof of the intent to desert must be shown by clear,
convincing and indisputable evidence, and that such burden of
proof is on the party claiming desertion.
Appellants have not borne the burden of proof required
of them in this matter.

Their only competent evidence in support

of desertion by Respondent is that Respondent failed to contact
the children from the day of the divorce between her and
Appellant, Nicholas M. Robertson (April 13, 1971, R. Ex. #1), as
alleged in the Petition for Adoption (R. 73), and July 1975
when Respondent did attempt to make contact (Tr. 15). Respondent
has explained this lapse of time as being due to a serious motorcycle accident which befell her on March 30, 1971 (Tr. 33) with
the following consequences to her:
(a)

Respondent was hospitalized for several weeks immediately after the accident, including the period
when Appellant Nicholas M. Robertson obtained a
default divorce (R. Ex. #1, Tr. 34).

(b)

Respondent's injuries consisted of a cerebral contusion, fractures of the jaw, fractures of the neck,
fracture of the left femor, and multiple lacerations
(R. Ex. #2, Tr. 34).

(c)

Respondent has undergone continual medical treatment
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since such accident, including at least two periods
of hospitalization for additional surgery incident
to the injuries sustained and at the time of trial
was still receiving treatment for the fractures to
her jaw (Tr. 34, 36).
(d)

Respondent experienced serious emotional difficulties
as a result of the accident and did not sufficiently
recover to a point where she felt able to cope with
responsibilities which would be incident to her
renewing an association with her children until the
summer of 1975 (Tr. 36, 37, 44).

(e)

Respondent, because of said accident, became heavily
in debt for medical expenses which amounted to approximately $8,000.00 (R. Ex. #2, Tr. 35).

(f)

Respondent did not receive any compensation for her
injuries until June of 1975 when she received a settlement of some $50,000.00 from a lawsuit instituted as
a consequence of her accident, which settlement permitted her to satisfy her medical debts and put her
in a financial position where she could effectively
meet obligations which would arise from a renewed
association with her children (Tr. 37).

The foregoing circumstances and conditions do offer a
reasonable explanation for the failure of respondent to contact
her children, particularly in view of the fact that she knew
they were being adequately cared for (Tr. 19, 38,44), and that
she wanted to put herself in a more stable position before trying to undertake caring for the children herself (Tr. 44). The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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evidence is clear that the Respondent did think of and have
concern for her children and did not intend to desert them.

The

trial court so found after having the opportunity to note the
demeanor of Respondent on the stand (R. 32, 33).
Appellants cite the case of GREENER vs. GREENER, 116 Utah
571, 212 P. 2d 194, as authority for the proposition that in
this case the appellate court is in just as good a position as
the trial court to judge the evidence, but on the contrary, the
case now before the Court is one of those referred to by this
Court in GREENER, whereby it held:
"In cases in which the emotions of the parties are apt
to influence their testimony, the opportunity to observe
them in the court room and especially on the witness
stand is of great importance". In such cases "we must
rely largely on the trial judge to resolve the conflicts".
The trial court, after hearing all the evidence, found no intent
on the part of the Respondent to desert her children.

Appellants

have made no showing that the evidence clearly preponderates
against such finding by the trial court, and consequently, such
finding should be sustained (NOKES vs. CONTINENTAL MINING AND
MILLING COMPANY, 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 594).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING, ON THE BASIS OF
IMMATERIALITY, ALLEGED EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT PRIOR
TO THE DATE OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
Appellants' contentions that the proffered testimony,
excluded by the court, concerning Respondent's actions prior to
the divorce decree, had a significant bearing upon the question
of desertion, are without substance.

During the entire period

prior to September 1970, with respect to which Appellants wanted
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to offer testimony, the Respondent had the children with her,
she took the children with her to Kentucky, refused to bring
the children back to Utah, and only relinquished them to the
Appellant, Nicholas M. Robertson, after a struggle and after
Appellant had caused Respondent to be jailed (Tr. 11, 12, 48,
49).

Respondent's failure to return to Utah with Appellant,

Nicholas M. Robertson, was not an abandonment of her children,
but a refusal on her part to continue to live with a man whom
she no longer could tolerate.

Such conduct in no way demon-

strates desertion, but on the contrary, clearly shows that
Respondent asserted her interest and rights in such children
until such children were forcibly taken from her by the Appellant,
Nicholas M. Robertson.
All of the other alleged sordid conduct which Appellants
wanted to attribute to Respondent, even if true, and which
Respondent denied, could only go to the issues of the children's
welfare and the fitness of the Respondent to have custody thereof.
As this Court has previously held, the welfare of the children
is immaterial in adoption cases until the fact of desertion
within the meaning of the adoption statute has been shown by
clear and convincing evidence.

(WORTHAN vs. WALTON, supra;

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF MAESTAS, 531 Utah Reporter 492,
531 P. 2d 492; IN RE LEASE, 169 P. 816 [Washington]).
The decree of divorce (R. Ex. #1) obtained on a default
basis by Appellant, Nicholas M. Robertson, and based, no doubt,
on the alleged shortcomings of the Respondent, nevertheless confirmed Respondent's rights of visitation with respect to such
children, which provision Appellant said he insisted upon (Tr. 57).
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In fact he wanted to reconciliate with Respondent in spite of
the alleged reprehensible conduct he would now attribute to her
(Tr. 57). Such position taken by him then with respect to the
Respondent and the children is exactly the opposite of that
which Appellants now urge upon the Court.
Appellants' proffered testimony may have been material to
the issues pertaining to grounds for divorce or the welfare of
the children, but it has nothing significant at all to do with
the issue of desertion, and the court below was correct in so
holding.
CONCLUSION
Appellants have failed to sustain their burden of showing
desertion of said children by the respondent by clear, convincing
and indisputable evidence and the judgment of the court below
should be sustained.

Respectfully submitted,
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